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Legal Dimensions of International 
Framework Agreements in the Field 
of Corporate Social Responsibility
ANDRÉ SOBCZAK1*
The aim of this article is to offer an in-depth analysis of the 
different legal aspects of international framework agreements 
(IFAs) negotiated between multinational companies and global 
union federations. Using examples from different agreements, the 
article shows the potential added value IFAs have in contributing 
to an effective social regulation within international groups and 
global supply chains that are today regulated insufficiently by 
national, European and international labour law standards. It also 
analyses the impact of the international negotiation process of the 
IFAs and the powers of the signatory parties on the legally binding 
character of these texts. To conclude, the article discusses the 
potential added value of an optional legal framework for IFAs.
Between 2000 and 2007, about 50 international framework agreements 
(hereafter IFAs) have been negotiated in the field of corporate social 
responsibility (hereafter CSR) between multinational companies and 
international trade union federations to define labour standards for 
the workers of the company, its subsidiaries and in many cases, of its 
subcontractors (see table 1 for a list of existing IFAs). The development 
of this form of social regulation (Drouin, 2005; Daugareilh, 2005a; for 
a historical approach: Descolonges, 2006) is linked to two converging 
interests. On the one hand, companies intend to increase the legitimacy 
and the credibility of their strategies and actions in the field of CSR, which 
supposes to transform their unilateral commitments into negotiated texts 
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and to involve their stakeholders in dissemination and monitoring. On the 
other hand, trade unions recognize that such negotiated strategies may 
complement the existing national and international instruments of social 
regulation that remain insufficient to face the challenges of globalization 
(Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005; Sobczak and Havard, 2006).
TABLE 1
List of International Framework Agreements
Company Year Country Global Union 
Federation
Signature 
by EWC
Signature 
by National 
Union
Danone 1989 France IUF No No
Accor 1995 France IUF No No
Faber Castell 2000 Germany BWI No Yes
Hochtief 2000 Germany BWI Yes Yes
Freudenberg 2000 Germany ICEM No Yes
Carrefour 2000 France UNI No No
Merloni 2001 Italy IMF No Yes
OTE 2001 Greece UNI No Yes
Skanska 2001 Sweden BWI No No
Telefonica 2001 Spain UNI No Yes
Chiquita 2001 USA IUF No No
IKEA 2001 Sweden BWI No No
Anglogold 2002 South Africa ICEM No No
Endesa 2002 Spain ICEM No Yes
Ballast Nedam 2002 Netherlands BWI No No
Fonterra 2002 New Zealand IUF No Yes
Volkswagen 2002 Germany IMF Yes No
Norske Skog 2002 Norway ICEM No Yes
DaimlerChrysler 2002 Germany IMF Yes No
Leoni 2002 Germany IMF Yes No
Eni 2002 Italy ICEM No Yes
ISS 2003 Denmark UNI No No
GEA 2003 Germany IMF Yes No
Statoil 2003 Norway ICEM No Yes
Rheinmetall 2003 Germany IMF Yes No
SKF 2003 Sweden IMF No No
Lukoil 2004 Russia ICEM No Yes
H & M 2004 Sweden UNI No No
Bosch 2004 Germany IMF No No
SCA 2004 Sweden ICEM Yes Yes
Prym 2004 Germany IMF Yes No
Renault 2004 France IMF Yes Yes
Impreglio 2004 Italy BWI No Yes
Röchling 2004 Germany IMF Yes No
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Company Year Country Global Union 
Federation
Signature 
by EWC
Signature 
by National 
Union
BMW 2005 Germany IMF Yes No
Rhodia 2005 France ICEM No No
EDF 2005 France ICEM No Yes
Veidekke 2005 Norway BWI No Yes
EADS 2005 Netherlands IMF Yes No
Schwan Stabilo 2005 Germany BWI No Yes
Lafarge 2005 France ICEM & BWI No No
Arcelor 2005 Luxemburg IMF No No
Nampak 2006 South Africa UNI No No
Portugal Telecom 2006 Portugal UNI No Yes
PSA Peugeot Citroën 2006 France IMF No Yes
Royal BAM 2006 Netherlands BWI No No
Euradius 2006 Netherlands UNI No Yes
Staedler 2006 Germany BWI No Yes
France Telecom 2007 France UNI No No
IFAs differ from other CSR norms, in particular codes of conduct that 
are often adopted unilaterally by the companies’ management (Sobczak, 
2002), even if the latter may have an impact on new forms of social dialogue 
(Vallée, 2003). First, codes of conduct suffer from a lack of legitimacy 
in continental Europe where national labour laws have always aimed at 
limiting the unilateral powers of the employer (Supiot, 2001) and favoured 
a regulation either imposed by public authorities or negotiated between 
the social partners. Second, codes of conduct often have a limited content 
that does not always refer to the ILO, concentrating on issues that have 
a high impact in the media, such as child labour (Gordon and Miyake, 
1999). Finally, codes of conduct do not always include provisions on their 
implementation, and are thus often considered as window-dressing or part 
of the companies’ marketing strategies. IFAs seem to be a more legitimate 
form of social regulation and provide a better guarantee for effectiveness. 
They generally have a much broader and more precise content and contain 
detailed provisions on monitoring and implementation. Emerging from 
social dialogue, they conform to the European social model (Daugareilh, 
2006). This is highlighted by the fact that almost all existing IFAs have 
been signed with companies having their seat in the European Union, and 
in particular in France and Germany.
However, IFAs are at odds with the categories of labour law. They 
may not be considered as collective agreements as they exist in national 
labour laws and continue to leave many legal questions open which can 
TABLE 1 (continued)
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lead to mistrust among the social partners and other actors. The lack of legal 
security is a problem for the unions for whom the support to companies’ 
CSR strategies is new and represents an important challenge (Sobczak and 
Havard, 2006). It is essential for the unions to be able to show that their 
support contributes to creating concrete advantages for the workers on a 
local level and thus that the non-respect of IFAs may lead to sanctions. 
Otherwise, unions may be seen as being used in the companies’ marketing 
strategies. The lack of legal security is also a problem for the companies. A 
company having signed an IFA may fear court decisions as NGOs of other 
citizens may introduce actions against them if the provisions guaranteed by 
the IFA are not respected within some of its subsidiaries or subcontracting 
companies, even if it has used its economic powers to force the latter to 
conform to the principles included in the agreement. It is important for 
companies to evaluate the legal risk of the signature of an IFA. It is also 
essential for them that those companies that sign an IFA without respecting 
it are sanctioned in order to avoid that all IFAs suffer from discredit.
The aim of this article is to offer an in-depth analysis of the different 
legal aspects of IFAs. This analysis is useful for the social partners having 
signed these texts or planning to do it, but also for managers who implement 
these texts and for international organizations that may have a role to play 
in the development of a legal framework for IFAs. In a first section, the 
article uses different examples of IFAs to show the potential these texts 
have in improving the social regulation of international groups and global 
supply chains that are today regulated insufficiently by national, European 
and international labour law standards. In a second section, the article 
analyses the impact of the international negotiation process of the IFAs 
and the powers of the signatory parties on the legally binding character of 
these texts. To conclude, the article discusses the potential added value of 
an optional legal framework for IFAs.
IFA’S POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO AN EFFECTIVE 
SOCIAL REGULATION WITHIN INTERNATIONAL GROUPS 
AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
Social regulation through labour law norms is currently facing several 
challenges linked to the impact of globalization (Hepple, 2005; Moreau, 2006). 
A first challenge is related to the limited scope of application of labour law. 
Labour law norms, be they imposed by the public authorities or negotiated by 
the social partners (Gérard, Ost and van de Kerchove, 1996), continue to be 
deeply embedded in the national context, whereas companies and thus labour 
relations are increasingly international (Murray and Trudeau, 2004; Gendron, 
Lapointe et Turcotte, 2004). Furthermore, labour law only regulates relations 
470 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2007, VOL. 62, No 3
between employers and the workers bound to them through a contract of 
employment, ignoring thus the relations between the headquarters and those 
working for subsidiaries or suppliers and subcontractors (Sobczak, 2003). 
A second challenge is linked to the need for social regulation to include 
issues that are not directly related to working conditions and correspond to 
much broader social or even environmental aspects linked to the life of the 
workers and their families. Such a global approach is hardly compatible with 
a strict separation of legal branches, such as labour law, social security law 
and environmental law, each of them developing more or less independently 
from the others and involving other actors. A third challenge corresponds 
to the lack of effectiveness of labour law. There is a gap between the 
development of legally binding texts in all parts of the world and their concrete 
implementation within the companies. This is linked to a lack of control, but 
also to some extent to an insufficient collective ownership of these texts by 
both the management and the workers.
IFAs seem to have the potential to face these three challenges for 
social regulation in the era of globalization and to contribute to an 
effective social regulation within international groups and global supply 
chains, complementing thus national, European and international labour 
law standards without replacing them. To demonstrate this potential, this 
section analyses their scope of application, the rights they confer and the 
monitoring procedures they install.
IFA’s Broad Scope of Application
To evaluate the impact of a legal norm, it is essential to define its scope 
of application. This is in particular true in the field of social regulation 
where there are already labour law standards defined at the national, the 
European or the international level (Sciarra, 1995). The potential of CSR 
norms and IFAs depends on their capacity to go beyond the existing legal 
standards and collective agreements that are already compulsory for the 
companies. Most IFAs do not increase the rights of the workers that have a 
contract of employment with the company and that are thus already covered 
by labour law. However, they represent an added value for the workers in 
subsidiaries and subcontracting companies, because through its signature 
of the IFA the company recognizes its responsibility for the respect of their 
social rights, filling thus the existing gap in labour law that continues to 
consider that these workers have no legal link with the company, even if it 
exerts the economic power.
Most IFAs indicate that the norms they contain apply to the whole 
group.
BMW (2005): “The goals and principles of implementation set out in this joint 
declaration apply for the BMW Group worldwide.”
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Some IFAs establish that their commitment varies according to 
the degree of power they have within their different subsidiaries. Such 
a distinction seems legitimate and has the advantage of not creating 
expectations that may not be satisfied later. Indeed, whereas the respect 
of the IFA can be made compulsory in subsidiaries where the holding 
has a direct control, the latter can only try to convince the management in 
subsidiaries where it has no direct control.
ARCELOR (2005): “Group subsidiaries over which Arcelor exercises 
a dominant influence ensure that the provisions of this agreement are 
implemented, while taking local factors (rules and practices) into consideration. 
In the subsidiaries where the Arcelor Group has a significant presence, but 
does not exercise a dominant influence, the signatory parties undertake to 
jointly put to use all of the resources at their disposal in order to promote the 
principles stated in this agreement.”
However, only very few of them precisely define the borders of the 
group. This is a weakness insofar as the definition of groups remains very 
vague in most national laws (Hopt, 1982; Sugarman and Teubner, 1990). 
At best, the group is a functional notion whose definition differs according 
to the relevant field. In the absence of a definition in the IFA, one may 
consider that the definition of the group is the one of the national law of 
the country where the holding company has its seat. To avoid conflicts 
of interpretation, IFAs should nevertheless indicate their definition of the 
group, as it is the case in some recent texts that refer to subsidiaries in which 
the holding company holds the majority of the capital or of the voting rights 
or can appoint the majority of the directors.
EDF (2005): “This Agreement shall apply to those companies over which 
EDF Group holds direct control, i.e. companies in which EDF owns a majority 
shareholding, or enjoys a majority of voting rights linked to the stock issued, 
or appoints over half of the members of the directing, executive or supervisory 
bodies.”
As for the relations with suppliers and subcontractors, a main 
challenge for social regulation, almost 80% of the existing IFAs contain 
provisions dealing with this issue, showing thus that the signatory parties 
have identified the potential added value of IFAs as compared to existing 
labour law standards. In many IFAs, however, the companies only make 
the commitment to inform or encourage the suppliers and subcontractors 
to respect the IFA or parts of it, without specifying the consequences of 
the non-respect of these principles.
STATOIL (2003): “Statoil will notify its subcontractors and licensees of this 
agreement and encourage compliance with the standards. Schwan STABILO 
expects of its suppliers to apply similar principles and regards this as being a 
basis for any enduring business partnership.”
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Some IFAs go beyond such a vague commitment and affirm that the 
respect of the IFA is the condition for being chosen and maintained as a 
supplier or subcontractor.
EADS (2005): “Compliance with EADS standards serves as a criterion for 
selecting suppliers.”
ROYAL BAM (2006): “Royal BAM Group NV considers the respect 
for workers’ rights to be crucial element in sustainable development
and will therefore refrain from using the services of those trading
partners, subcontractors and suppliers which do not respect the criteria listed 
above.”
In case of non-respect, some IFAs contain precise sanctions for 
suppliers and subcontractors, including the termination of the contract. In 
principle, these sanctions only apply in the case of violations of clauses that 
are considered to be the most important ones, for example the provisions 
on health and safety or on human rights. This reflects the balance the 
companies try to create between the definition of some principles that have 
to apply throughout the global supply chain and the autonomy of the legally 
independent suppliers and subcontractors and their local context.
RHODIA (2005): “Any serious violation of employee health and safety 
legislation, environmental protection or basic human rights that is not remedied 
shall lead to termination of relations with the company concerned in compliance 
with contractual obligations.”
The fact that the termination of the contract with the supplier or 
subcontractor is mentioned as a possible sanction in case of non-respect 
increases the credibility the signatory parties attach to the relevant 
principles. The successful implementation of the IFA supposes, however, 
also that the suppliers and subcontractors are informed or even trained 
not only on the content of the IFA, but also on the advantages of a more 
responsible way of management. They should thus receive support from 
the company imposing the respect of the IFA. Only very few IFAs mention 
this aspect explicitly.
PSA (2006): “A specific process will also be implemented for small suppliers 
and subcontractors so that they may apply the aforementioned ILO standards 
gradually.”
Whatever be the content of the provisions on the company’s suppliers 
and subcontractors, it is essential that they are not limited to the direct 
contractors of the company, but include also the suppliers of the suppliers, 
as it is specified by some IFAs.
EDF (2005): “The subcontractor must apply the requirements set out by 
EDF Group to any other subcontractor hired by him/her for the assignment 
in question.”
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The Rights Conferred by IFAs
In comparison to unilateral codes of conduct, the definition of the 
rights conferred by IFAs is much more precise. IFAs systematically include 
provisions on the four fundamental social rights, i.e. the prohibition of forced 
labour, of child labour and of discrimination as well as the recognition of 
freedom of association. On the contrary, in many codes of conduct, freedom 
of association is not an issue (Gordon and Miyake, 1999). Furthermore, all 
IFAs refer to the ILO conventions for the definition of the social norms 
they contain rather than to adopt specific standards whose legitimacy may 
be questioned. More than one IFA out of two explicitly mentions the eight 
ILO core conventions dealing with the four fundamental social rights.1
The reference to these ILO core conventions has insofar an added 
value as these conventions only impose obligations on the States that have 
decided to ratify them. There are still several States in the world that have 
not ratified all eight ILO core conventions. If the company’s IFA refers 
to these core conventions, it is committed to respect them also in those 
countries that have not ratified them. Furthermore, any reference to ILO 
conventions in an IFA signed by the company constitutes a progress, insofar 
as the commitment concerns also the workers of the subsidiaries and of its 
suppliers and subcontractors. For the same reason, even provisions that are 
limited to the respect of the national labour law or of collective agreements 
are not useless. In many States, the control of labour law standards by the 
public authorities is insufficient if not inexistent. Even if these standards 
are legally binding, they are not necessarily effective. When including the 
respect of national laws in the IFA, their effectiveness may be increased 
because of the procedures on monitoring and implementation most IFAs 
contain.
Beyond the reference to the fundamental social rights, many IFAs 
contain provisions on other issues directly linked to working conditions and 
employment. About 85% of the existing IFAs deal, for example, with health 
and safety. The content of the provisions in this field varies a lot, ranging 
from IFAs that refer only to the national labour laws to those that mention 
the ILO norms and those that are committed to a more proactive approach 
based on the development of training and continuous improvement.
1. C. 29 Forced Labour Convention, 1930 ; C. 87 Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 ; C. 98 Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949; C. 100 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951; C. 105 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957; C. 111 Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958; C. 138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973: C. 1982 Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999.
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ROYAL BAM (2006): “A safe and healthy working environment shall be 
provided (ILO Convention 155 and 167). Best occupational health and safety 
practice shall be followed and shall be in compliance with the ILO Guidelines 
for Occupational Health and Safety Management System. All workers shall 
be given training on occupational hazards and shall have means of preventing 
them.”
Similar differences appear among the provisions that 70% of the 
existing IFAs contain on wages. In this field, most IFAs only refer to the 
respect of the national labour law, the relevant collective agreements or 
industry standards. Some companies are more ambitious and aim at offering 
pay wages that are sufficient to meet the basic needs of the workers, or 
even of their families.
EURADIUS (2006): “The wages and allowances that the employees receive 
shall correspond to a standard working week and shall at least equal those 
established by law or by the collective labour agreements in the country in 
question for work of a similar nature, in the sector active in the area where the 
work is performed. No employee shall receive payment that is below the legal 
minimum wage. Wages shall always be sufficient to meet the basic needs of 
the employees and their families, with a certain amount of disposable income 
(Conventions 94, 95 and 131 of the ILO).”
More than 50% of the existing IFAs include specific provisions on 
restructuring. In the era of globalization, this issue is indeed a major 
challenge for companies and their workers (Segal, Triomphe and Sobczak, 
2003). The potential impact of IFAs is crucial in this field because national 
and European labour law standards are not sufficiently putting the emphasis 
on a proactive approach aiming at preparing the employees for future 
changes in their career. Many IFAs contain in particular the commitment 
to inform the workers’ representatives on future changes in the structure of 
the company in a timely manner, which is conform to the European labour 
law standards, but not to those in other parts of the world.
ARCELOR (2005): “Arcelor undertakes to anticipate, as much as possible, 
economic and industrial changes and their consequences in terms of human 
resources. The establishment of a prospective and permanent social dialogue 
will encourage the application of this principle of anticipation.”
To limit the social impact of restructuring, some IFAs also include 
commitments in terms of continuous training of the workers. One IFA 
explicitly mentions the creation of a special task force in charge of helping 
the workers having lost their jobs to find new ones within the group or on 
the labour market.
DANONE (1989): “In the event of major changes in working conditions or 
in business activities causing redundancies, the employees concerned should 
be entitled to receive training for the purpose of helping them find occupation 
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either within the companies of Danone Group or elsewhere. Consultations 
should take place as early as possible, and not later than 3 months prior to the 
expected changes, whenever said changes concern a significant number of jobs 
(partial or total closing) permanent jobs should be considered the priority. . . . A 
specific structure shall be set up whenever a management decision results in job 
losses. Its task shall be to help employees having lost their job find positions 
corresponding to their qualifications, skills, pay level, working conditions and 
place of residence. The structure shall be created at the time of management’s 
decision, subject to applicable legal provisions, and may remain in existence 
after the implementation of said decision.”
Finally, some IFAs contain norms that go beyond the scope of labour 
law and include other social issues linked to the impact of the company’s 
activities on the living conditions of the workers, their families or even the 
citizens in general. Almost 20% of the existing IFAs include, for example, 
provisions on the company’s policies to fight against AIDS.
ROYAL BAM (2006): “Royal BAM Group NV undertakes to raise awareness 
of the HIV/AIDS problem and of the prevention programme in compliance 
with the ILO HIV/AIDS code of practice.”
As IFAs are often embedded in the CSR strategies of the company, 
almost one out of two deals also with the protection of the environment. 
This rate increases to more than 80% for the companies in the chemical 
sector.
EADS (2005): “Aware that its activities interact with the environment, EADS 
therefore regards environmental protection as a fundamental part of its corporate 
social responsibility. Over and above compliance with international, European 
and national regulations, EADS is committed to continuously improving its 
environmental impact wherever the Group operates. In this context, EADS is 
ready to cooperate with the competent public institutions, as appropriate.”
Even if the legitimacy and the expertise of workers’ representatives may 
be questioned in the field of environmental protection, the integration of 
these issues in IFAs should be welcomed, insofar as a closer link between 
social and environmental issues is necessary for the success of a sound CSR 
strategy. This integration of environmental aspects in IFAs also opens new 
opportunities for a better co-operation between trade unions and NGOs, 
two key stakeholder groups for companies (Sobczak and Havard, 2006). 
Above all, it creates new perspectives for a more holistic approach to the 
different impacts companies have on their workers and society, and on the 
quality of life for workers, which may not be confined to working conditions 
and employment and also has to take into account their living conditions 
outside the company.
The content analysis of the existing IFAs enables us to distinguish 
different categories among these texts. Daugareilh (2005b) mentions three 
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different content profiles: IFAs that focus on one particular issue, IFAs that 
refer to fundamental social rights, and IFAs that include also provisions 
on working and employment conditions as well as on the implementation 
of the text. It is possible to add a forth category, i.e. IFAs that go beyond 
the scope of labour law and include other issues linked to the impact of 
the company’s activities on the company’s natural and social environment. 
While the more recent IFAs tend to correspond to the last category because 
the global union federations learn from their first experiences and companies 
start to compete on the most innovative content, it seems difficult to consider 
that the evolution is linear, insofar as the content of each IFA is the result of 
negotiations and embedded in the corporate culture. For example, the IFA 
adopted in the French Areva Group in 2007 only deals with one particular 
issue (diversity) like the two first IFAs adopted in the late 1980s and the 
middle of the 1990s at Danone and Accor.
IFA’s Implementation and Monitoring Procedures
Contrary to many codes of conduct but also many labour law standards, 
many IFAs contain precise provisions on their implementation in the 
different subsidiaries. Labour law standards suffer in many cases from a lack 
of effectiveness, in particular in developing countries that do not have the 
means or the willingness to organize a control by public authorities (Hepple, 
2002; Lascoumes and Serverin, 1986). Formally, the great majority of States 
in the world have ratified the ILO conventions on the fundamental social 
rights. Many States have also very precise labour law standards that are in 
line with the ILO conventions. However, these legally binding norms are 
far from being effective in all companies in these countries.
The added value of IFAs is not only to reaffirm these rights when 
referring to national labour law standards, but also to organize procedures 
on implementation and monitoring that aim at making them effective. 
Almost all IFAs indicate that they are disseminated among the whole 
workforce of the company and its subsidiaries. Comprehensive information 
on the existing social regulation is, of course, the first condition for their 
effectiveness. However, in many cases, workers ignore the content of codes 
of conduct and even of labour law standards. IFAs that are negotiated 
by the social partners have a much better chance to be considered as the 
collective ownership of these actors and thus known by the workforce. The 
responsibility for the dissemination of the IFA may be either in the hands 
of the management or in those of both social partners.
LUKOIL (2004): “ICEM will distribute copies of the Agreement to all its 
member unions, including those that organize employees in Lukoil companies 
around the world, and will broadly publicize the existence of the Agreement 
and explain its implications to the unions organizing workers within Lukoil. 
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Lukoil will in the same manner distribute copies of the Agreement to all Lukoil 
offices in the relevant local languages of the countries concerned.”
The involvement of the local social partners in the dissemination 
process seems particularly interesting, because it develops the feeling of 
a collective ownership of the IFA and because it allows to show the local 
workers the concrete impact of the text. To improve the effectiveness of the 
IFA, some companies are committed to translating the text into the local 
languages or to offer special training on the content of the text.
FONTERRA (2002): “Fonterra will distribute copies of this agreement to its 
local offices in a national language of the country concerned and will inform 
local management of the existence and contents of this agreement. The IUF 
will distribute copies of this agreement to all of its member trade unions that 
organize Fonterra’s employees. Fonterra, the IUF and the NZDWU shall co-
operate to give practical effect to this agreement. This includes communication, 
training or other means as appropriate.”
Almost all IFAs contain specific provisions on the monitoring process 
of the text. In principle, this process is the shared responsibility of the 
signatory parties, but it may also involve other actors, such as the European 
Works Council. Usually, there is at least one annual meeting between the 
management and the workers’ representatives to discuss on the actions that 
have been adopted and on the difficulties that have been met.
RÖCHLING (2004): “The parties to the Agreement shall act to ensure that 
the Agreement is respected, information regarding problems, differences or 
required changes in the basic principles shall be exchanged and discussed by 
the partners on an annual basis. This exchange of information is currently taking 
place in the European Works Council of Gebr. Röchling KG.”
A recent IFA explicitly defines an interesting monitoring procedure that 
involves the local social partners as well as those at the level of the group. 
This procedure reflects a principle of subsidiarity that takes into account the 
need for an approach based on the local realities while allowing a common 
approach at the group level.
PSA (2006): “This agreement will be monitored at two levels. In each of the 
major countries local social observatories will be set up. These will be made 
up of human resources divisions and labour unions. The social observatories 
will monitor the application of the Global Framework Agreement on an annual 
basis using a common monitoring document to be created jointly by the parties 
to this agreement. At the corporate level, a report on the deployment of the 
agreement in the countries concerned will be presented each year to the PSA 
Peugeot Citroën Extended European Council on Social Responsibility.”
Some IFAs contain very detailed provisions on the organization of 
the annual meeting, such as the documents that have to be addressed to
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the workers’ representatives beforehand, the time to be spent for discussions 
during the meeting and the financing of the costs created by the meeting.
OTE (2001): “The joint annual meeting will last at least one day and will be 
preceded by a preparatory meeting with UNI/OME-OTE delegations of at least 
one day. At the joint annual meeting OTE management will communicate 
general information in the form of an oral presentation and written documents 
regarding the company’s world-wide activities and prospects and their impact 
on employees’ interests. . . . The costs arising out of the application of this 
agreement will be borne by OTE. These costs include the necessary travel, 
accommodation and other expenses of an agreed number of UNI delegates, the 
facilities needed to hold the joint and preparatory meetings, and the costs of 
the contact persons. Any UNI delegates who are OTE employees will receive 
their normal pay during their absence for the meetings.”
Only one IFA explicitly mentions the possibility to invite NGOs to the 
annual meetings. This illustrates the difficulties to transform the bilateral 
social dialogue into a trilateral dialogue, even if such an approach would be 
more coherent with the tendency of most IFAs to include other rights than 
those directly linked to working conditions and employment.
EDF (2005): “The Committee may invite NGO representatives to attend its 
assemblies, by common agreement among its Members, and as justified by 
relevant items on the meeting agenda.”
Many IFAs define complaint procedures enabling the workers to act if 
there is a violation of the rights conferred by the agreement. Usually, the 
workers or their local representatives have to meet at a first stage the local 
management. If the problem cannot be solved at this level, the worker or 
the union can contact the national union that will discuss the issue with the 
national headquarters of the company. If the problem can still not be solved 
at this level, the signatory parties of the IFA will deal with the conflict. 
The main advantage of this multi-level approach is that it may favour the 
diffusion of the IFA to managers and workers’ representatives at all levels of 
the company, reinforcing thus the chances that the text will be effective.
VEIDEKKE (2005): “In the event of a complaint or an infringement of the 
agreement the following procedure will normally apply: Firstly, the complaint 
should be raised with the local site management. If the complaint is not resolved 
with local management, it should be referred to the appropriate national 
union who will raise the issue with the company’s regional president. If still 
unresolved, the complaint will be referred to the IFBWW Geneva office, which 
will raise the matter with the company’s Corporate Management.”
During the annual meeting, the signatory parties can decide to amend 
the initial text. Several IFAs explicitly mention this possibility.
ROYAL BAM (2006): “The present accord may be revised at the request of 
one of the parties, which revision needs the consent of the other party, no later 
than two years after it has been signed.”
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No problem will arise if all signatory parties agree on the amendment, 
but there is a risk that no consensus may be reached and this may cause a 
legal problem. In any case, each signatory party has the possibility to cancel 
the agreement. Such a cancellation has no impact if the management and at 
least one of the different workers’ representatives continue to support the 
agreement. Otherwise, the IFA will stop from producing effects.
Through their scope of application, the rights they confer and the 
monitoring procedures they put in place, IFAs have the potential to 
contribute to a more effective social regulation within international 
groups and global supply chains. However, not all IFAs have such an 
ambition, and the potential of some texts is much lower. Even if there are 
model agreements developed by the global union federations, each IFA is 
negotiated and is thus different from the others. Under these conditions, the 
potential of each IFA differs from the one of others. The signatory parties, 
however, usually analyse the IFAs adopted by other companies before 
negotiating a new text, contributing thus to creating an inter-organizational 
learning process and favouring the development of the potential of IFAs in 
terms of social regulation. This underlines that the potential added value 
of IFAs lies both in their content and in the negotiation process between 
the management and the workers’ representatives. From a legal point of 
view, however, this negotiation process poses several questions linked to 
the powers of the involved parties.
THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS OF IFAS 
AND ITS IMPACT ON THEIR LEGAL VALUE
The legal nature of a norm depends on the powers conferred to 
its authors, in particular if the norm aims at defining rules of conduct 
applying to third parties. Given the lack of a legal framework in the field of 
transnational collective bargaining, no power has been explicitly conferred 
by labour law to any actor to negotiate such agreements. Consequently, 
those who want to adopt IFAs act in an unclear context and have to invent 
new solutions.
In some cases, public authorities such as ministers of labour attend 
the signature of the IFA by the representatives of the management and of 
the employees. Chiquita’s IFA has even been co-signed by the director 
general of the ILO. From a legal point of view, such a co-signature is 
surprising, as it does not correspond to any specific commitments of the 
ILO. The aim is rather to increase the public character of the IFA and to 
demonstrate the support for this form of social regulation by a legitimate 
international actor.
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Beyond the issue of third parties attending the signature of the IFA or 
co-signing it, other legal questions arise and relate to the identification of 
the representatives both on the employer side and on the workers’ side.
Signatory Parties Representing the Employer
For the employers, the IFA is signed by one or several representatives of 
the company’s headquarters, usually either the CEO or the human resource 
manager. This solution reflects the reality of economic powers within the 
company, but constitutes a legal problem, because each subsidiary has 
its own legal personality, even if it is highly integrated in a group. There 
is indeed a gap between the holding’s control over an economic activity 
within a group and the lack of its legal liability for the social consequences 
of this activity (Hopt, 1982; Sugarman and Teubner, 1990; Rorive, 2004). 
This gap makes it legally impossible to consider the holding company as 
the employer of the workers in the subsidiaries (Supiot, 1985), but also 
means that the holding company may not conclude collective agreements 
that bind the subsidiaries. If some national labour laws, such as the French 
one (Antonmattei, 2004), recognize today the existence of collective 
agreements at the group level and thus the power of the holding company to 
represent its subsidiaries in the negotiation process, such a provision lacks 
at the EU and at the international level. Consequently, the signature only 
by a representative of the holding company precludes the IFA from being 
considered as a collective agreement as defined in labour law.
To allow companies to conclude IFAs for their subsidiaries and 
subcontractors, they have to receive a mandate to negotiate legally binding 
commitments. The Directive of September 22nd, 1994 on European Works 
Councils uses this legal technique. For companies or groups with a European 
dimension, the Directive imposes the obligation to open negotiations 
on information and consultation within the whole group with the aim 
to conclude an agreement that applies to all subsidiaries within the EU. 
However, in this case, the mandate to negotiate is explicitly conferred 
by the Directive. Furthermore, the agreement establishing the European 
Works Council creates obligations for the holding company, i.e. delivering 
information and opening consultations, not for the subsidiaries. IFAs, on the 
contrary, contain norms that have to be applied by the subsidiaries, even if 
the holding company can be considered as guaranteeing the respect of the 
norms in the agreement. Consequently, an explicit mandate to negotiate such 
agreements conferred to the holding company by a specific legislation would 
clarify the legal value of IFAs and recreate a link between the economic 
powers and the social responsibilities within the group.
Another possibility for clarifying the legal status would be to transpose 
the IFA through local collective agreements concluded with the different 
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subsidiaries according to national labour laws. This solution is inspired 
by the autonomous agreements mentioned in Article 139 of the EU 
Treaty which suggests that social partners transpose collective agreements 
concluded at the EU level through national collective agreements in order 
to provide them with a clear legal status and to avoid the legal problems 
linked to the international dimension. Only a few IFAs explicitly mention 
such an involvement of the local social partners, even if it would facilitate 
the implementation of the text. Among the IFAs dealing with such a local 
social dialogue, many concern French companies.
DANONE (1989): “The local management of Danone companies and the trade 
unions—or in their absence employee representatives—are now responsible for 
translating the general principles outlined below into practical provisions.”
EDF (2005): “In each Group company concerned, dialogue shall be initiated 
between the management and the employee representatives on the initiatives to 
be taken and the conditions for the implementation of the present Agreement, 
within a period of six months following its signature.”
The choice of the signatory party representing the employer has an 
impact on the legal value of IFAs. The choice of efficiency, i.e. the signature 
by the CEO of the holding company, does not seem to be legal problem 
that may not find a solution. This is true in particular because the main 
aim of IFAs is to confer new responsibilities for the holding company that 
is not the employer of the workers in the subsidiaries rather than for the 
subsidiaries that already have to respect labour law in the relations with 
their employees. The choice of the signatory party representing the workers 
may be more complicated.
The Signatory Parties Representing the Workers
For the workers, different actors have signed the existing IFAs. It would 
be impossible to conceive that only the workers’ representatives in the 
holding company negotiate an IFA that applies to workers in the subsidiaries 
and even to the ones in the subcontracting companies. Such a solution would 
challenge the principle of the legal autonomy of the subsidiaries as it is the 
case on the employer side, but also create a problem of representativity. 
It would indeed be difficult to consider that workers’ representatives at 
the headquarters of a company in a (Western) country may legitimately 
represent the interests of the workers of its subsidiaries in the whole world. 
The idea of a legal mandate conferred to the workers’ representatives at the 
headquarters that may be envisaged for employers is difficult to transpose 
here, because the problem is not only a legal one.
The social partners had thus to invent and test new solutions to insure 
the legitimacy of the signatory parties on the worker side. All existing IFAs 
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have been signed by a global union federation, but some have been co-
signed with other workers’ representatives, either by the European Works 
Council, by national unions or by both (table 1).
Signature by Global Union Federations
All existing IFAs are signed by one or several global union federations 
organized at the sector level. The International Metalworkers Federation 
(IMF) has been the most active global union federation in this field with 15 
IFAs, followed by the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine 
and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM) and Building and Wood Workers’ 
International (BWI) with both 11 IFAs and Union Network International 
(UNI) with 10 IFAs. The International Union of Food workers (IUF) had 
signed the two first IFAs, but has stopped signing these agreements after 
their forth IFA in 2002.
The choice of the sector level avoids two main obstacles existing for 
transnational collective bargaining at the company level. First, negotiating 
with workers’ representatives at the sector level excludes the debates on 
the legal personality of subsidiaries and even of subcontracting companies. 
The global union federation at the sector level is supposed to represent 
the workers in all the companies of the world, whatever be the legal link 
with the company signing the IFA, as long as the companies belong to 
the relevant economic sector. Second, negotiating with a global union 
federation avoids the conflicts between different national laws defining the 
legitimate workers’ representatives as well as the procedures of collective 
bargaining. It seems coherent with the aim to establish social norms at the 
transnational level to chose an actor situated at the same international level 
as the company.
However, neither national, nor European or international labour law 
norms confer a power to negotiate collective agreements to global union 
federations. This bargaining power also needs the support of the national 
unions that are members of the global union federation. Beyond a general 
political mandate to promote IFAs defined within their governing bodies, 
the global union federations thus usually consult the relevant national 
unions before signing an IFA, at least those of the country of the company’s 
headquarters.
From a legal point of view, the signature of an IFA by a global union 
federation creates a problem of asymmetry between the two actors involved 
in the process. Whereas the workers’ representatives are organized at the 
sector level, their partner is an individual company and not the employers’ 
association at the sector level. This asymmetry contrasts with the existing 
legal categories in labour law distinguishing sector agreements on the 
one hand and company agreements on the other hand. It constitutes thus 
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a further obstacle to the recognition of IFAs as collective agreements as 
they exist in labour law.
Signature by European Works Councils
About 25% of the existing IFAs have been co-signed by the global 
union federations and the EWC of the relevant company. In some sectors, 
the part of IFAs co-signed with the EWC is even higher. For example, almost 
all IFAs signed by the IMF have also the co-signature of the company’s 
EWC. Furthermore, in several companies, the negotiation process had 
been launched within the EWC, even if in the end the latter did not sign 
the IFA. This highlights the fact that the EWC is more and more perceived 
by management as a legitimate or even as the natural discussion partner on 
social regulations, at least for companies having their seat in Europe.
On the contrary to negotiations with the global union federation, those 
conducted between the company and its EWC do not create an asymmetry 
of the levels of representation. Negotiating with the EWC allows to build 
on the existing social dialogue within the company, to better take into 
account the specific issues and priorities of the company and to establish 
permanent and long lasting relations, which may be more difficult with 
an global union federation whose activities are much broader and whose 
resources are limited.
From a legal point of view, however, the signature of an IFA by 
the EWC constitutes a problem insofar as the directive that governs this 
institution has not conferred any bargaining powers to it, but has limited 
its powers to information and consultation. One reason for this is that the 
transposition of the directive by national labour laws does not guarantee 
that only union representatives have a seat in the EWC, whereas collective 
bargaining is in many EU Member States a monopoly of the unions. If the 
EWC is supposed to have the power to conclude collective agreements, its 
composition has thus probably to be changed in order to guarantee that only 
union representatives may be appointed to this council.
A second problem is that the EWC does not represent the workers in 
countries others than those of the EU, nor the workers in the subcontracting 
companies, whereas the added value of IFAs mainly lies in the provisions 
concerning these two groups. Indeed, IFAs hardly improve the social 
regulation for workers in European subsidiaries already covered by 
national and European labour laws, but offer additional protection for the 
members of the two other groups. The latter should thus be involved in the 
process via their representatives. If it seems almost impossible to involve 
the workers in the subcontracting companies, this is not the case for the 
workers in non-European subsidiaries. In a few companies, the negotiations 
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have indeed been carried out with an enlarged EWC including members 
from countries others than the EU. In the case of PSA, the experience of 
the negotiation and implementation of the IFA with an enlarged EWC is 
even used as an opportunity to test the transformation of the EWC into a 
World Works Council.
PSA (2006): “With regard to global changes in the corporation’s business, 
the parties of this agreement feel that the creation, in due time, of a Global 
Council is beneficial. Initially, the current PSA Peugeot Citroën European 
Works Council will be expanded to include labour union representatives from 
the countries that meet the staffing level requirements set forth in the European 
Works Council agreement (such as Argentina and Brazil). These representatives 
will be invited to plenary sessions as observers. The parties agree to examine, 
after 3 years, the opportunity to definitively undertake the transformation into 
a Global Council, given that the European directives will legitimately apply to 
the European subsidiaries and the Extended European Council.”
When analyzing these legal problems caused by the signature of the 
IFA with the EWC, one must take into account that the EWC is not the only 
signatory party on the workers side. The EWC always co-signs the IFA with 
a global union federation. It is this combination of two different forms of 
workers’ representation—one at the sector level and one at the company 
level—that makes this model particularly interesting and legitimate. From 
the legal point of view, however, even the co-signature by the two forms 
of workers’ representation does not transform the IFA into a collective 
agreement as it exists in labour law, as neither of the two has the legal 
power to conclude collective agreements.
Signature by National Unions
About 45% of the existing IFAs are co-signed on the worker side 
by a global union federation and national unions in the country of the 
company’s headquarters. Even if the national unions do not sign, global 
union federations of course consult them, and in many cases the national 
unions are the driving forces for the negotiation of the IFA (Bourque, 2005). 
The option of a co-signature by the national union is used in particular for 
the IFAs negotiated by BWI and ICEM. In three cases, the IFAs have even 
been signed by the three possible forms of worker representation, i.e. the 
global union federation, the EWC and the national unions.
The signature by a national union has the potential to transform the 
IFA into a national collective agreement in the country of the company’s 
headquarters, as long as the rules of the national labour law in this country 
are respected. It seems, however, difficult to consider that such an agreement 
will also be considered as a collective agreement in the other countries 
because national labour laws in this field differ a lot.
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The advantage of involving the national unions in the negotiation 
process lies in the fact that they already know the representatives of the 
company’s headquarters through the negotiations of national collective 
agreements. As for the involvement of the EWC, this may facilitate the 
discussions on much more complex issues included in the IFA. There is 
however a problem of legitimacy for the national union in the country of 
the headquarters to negotiate the definition of social regulation whose main 
added value concerns the workers in other countries, but the national union 
does not negotiate alone and one may consider that the workers in the other 
countries are represented by the global union federation.
Another possibility is to involve the national unions of all countries 
where the company has major subsidiaries. This approach has been used in 
two recent IFAs and is an interesting way to stimulate local social dialogue 
on the issues dealt with by the IFA and to improve thus the chances of its 
effective implementation in all subsidiaries. The IFA concluded at EDF 
(2005) is particularly innovative, as it was negotiated by a group composed 
of representatives of national unions of all the main subsidiaries and by 
managers of these subsidiaries. Even if this process was particularly long 
and complex, it had the advantage of creating a shared vision of the main 
issues for the company and the local realities, allowing thus a sound basis 
for the implementation of the IFA.
The approach was rather different for the IFA concluded at PSA (2006). 
Here the negotiations were organized between the company’s headquarters, 
the global union federation IMF and an extended EWC. The negotiating 
parties decided, however, to continuously inform the national unions in 
the countries with the major subsidiaries about the process, and to invite 
them to sign the final agreement during special events organized in each 
country. All national unions but one accepted to co-sign this document and 
to confirm thus their support to this initiative. The French CGT, the only 
union that decided not to sign the text considers, nevertheless, that it is 
bound by the text as it is member of the IMF that has signed the IFA. This 
experience had the advantage of using an efficient process of negotiation 
with a limited group of actors while involving the national unions on a more 
informal basis before obtaining their formal support.
Despite their contribution to a more effective social regulation, the 
involvement of the national unions of all main subsidiaries does not 
necessarily have an impact on the legal value of the IFA. To transform 
the IFA into a series of national collective agreements, as they exist in 
labour law, the text has to be signed not only by the national unions but 
also by the local managers, which is not the case, even at EDF where the 
managers have taken part in the negotiation but without signing the final 
text. EDF’s IFA as well as PSA’s include, however, the commitment to 
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open local negotiations aiming at transposing the text into national collective 
agreements. Such an approach avoids any discussion about the legal value of 
the IFA itself, because the legal value of the national collective agreements 
is clearly defined by the different national labour laws. But, since only very 
few IFAs are transposed through such national collective agreements, it 
seems necessary to conclude this article with an analysis on the legal value 
of IFAs and the potential added value of an optional legal framework for 
their negotiation.
CONCLUSION
IFAs have the potential to contribute to the creation of an effective 
social regulation within international groups and global supply chains. 
They have, however, an unclear legal status that may weaken their 
potential. Even if the lack of a clear legal status has not been an obstacle 
for the development of IFAs, it may become a problem in the future. Both 
parties have an interest in evaluating the legal risks they face in case of a 
non-respect of the commitments included in the IFAs. Such a risk is less 
linked to a potential conflict between the signatory parties insofar as the 
IFAs themselves may define special dispute settlement mechanisms without 
involving the courts, than to a potential conflict with a third party, be it a 
NGO or an individual citizen. The example of Nike shows that a court may 
consider the violation of a public commitment in the field of CSR as a case 
of misleading advertisement and thus adopt sanctions against the company 
(Sobczak, 2003). Even if companies usually do not refer to their IFAs in 
their external communication, the risk of a conflict may not be excluded. 
Furthermore, both signatory parties have a shared interest to the fact that 
companies that sign an IFA without respecting it be sanctioned. Otherwise, 
the credibility of all IFAs may be weakened.
A legal framework for transnational collective bargaining may 
contribute to a higher legal security. Ideally, such a framework should be 
adopted at an international level, but the European level may constitute 
a first step and seems more realistic to attain in the mid-term future. The 
Ales report to the European Commission has defined the main elements of 
such a legal framework (Ales et al., 2006) which may only be optional, the 
social partners being free to choose its rules and to benefit from the legal 
security it offers or to continue to negotiate without any legal framework, 
as it is the case today.
The optional legal framework for transnational collective bargaining 
and IFAs might define the legitimate actors of the negotiation on the 
employer side and on the workers’ side. It seems in particular important 
to define the role of the global union federations at the sector level, of the 
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national unions in the subsidiaries and of the EWC during the negotiation 
process but also during the implementation and the monitoring of the texts. 
The optional legal framework might also impose a certain minimum content 
on the social partners as well as provisions on the scope of application 
and on the monitoring process, while leaving them a lot of freedom as 
to the definition of the scope and as to forms of the monitoring process. 
Finally, the optional legal framework for transnational collective bargaining 
might define the legal effects of IFAs. The best solution would probably 
be to impose that the IFA be transposed by texts adopted at the level of 
each subsidiary, be it through unilateral decisions of the management or 
through collective agreements. The legal value of those texts would change 
according to the national labour laws, but this solution would leave the 
necessary flexibility to the local social partners and avoid the problems 
linked to the determination of the applicable law.
The adoption of such an optional legal framework for transnational 
collective bargaining and IFAs by the EU institutions would solve many 
of the current legal problems created by IFAs and may thus favour their 
future development as a tool that contributes to an effective social regulation 
within international groups and global supply chains.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les dimensions juridiques des accords-cadres internationaux 
dans le domaine de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises
Entre 2000 et 2007, plus de 50 accords-cadres internationaux (ACI) 
sur la responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE) ont été négociés entre 
des entreprises multinationales et des fédérations syndicales internationales 
pour définir des normes sociales pour les salariés de ces entreprises, ceux de 
leurs filiales et souvent aussi de leurs sous-traitants. Le développement de 
cette nouvelle forme de régulation s’explique par deux intérêts convergents. 
D’un côté, les entreprises cherchent à renforcer la légitimité et la crédibilité 
de leurs stratégies et actions dans le domaine de la RSE, ce qui suppose 
de transformer leurs engagements unilatéraux dans des textes négociés et 
d’impliquer leurs parties prenantes dans la mise en œuvre et le contrôle. 
De l’autre côté, les organisations syndicales reconnaissent que de telles 
stratégies négociées peuvent compléter la régulation sociale existante qui 
se révèle insuffisante face aux défis de la mondialisation.
Certains ACI ont le potentiel de contribuer à une régulation sociale 
plus effective au sein des groupes internationaux et leurs chaînes 
d’approvisionnement, complétant ainsi les normes du travail au niveau 
national, européen et international, sans pour autant les remplacer. Par 
contre, tous les ACI n’ont pas cette ambition. L’analyse du contenu des 
ACI existants nous amène à distinguer différentes catégories de ce texte : 
des ACI qui se concentrent sur un seul aspect ; des ACI qui intègrent les 
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droits sociaux fondamentaux ; des ACI qui incluent aussi des dispositions 
sur les conditions de travail et d’emploi ; et des ACI qui vont au-delà du 
champ du droit du travail pour traiter d’autres sujets relatifs à l’impact 
des activités de l’entreprise sur son environnement social et naturel. Si les 
ACI plus récents tendent à correspondre à la dernière catégorie, parce que 
les fédérations syndicales internationales apprennent de leurs premières 
expériences et que les entreprises commencent à vouloir se distinguer par un 
contenu innovant de leur ACI, il est difficile de considérer que l’évolution 
est linéaire dans la mesure où le contenu de chaque ACI est le fruit d’une 
négociation spécifique et lié à la culture de l’entreprise.
Le potentiel des ACI dépend aussi de leur mise en œuvre et des 
procédures de contrôle qui diffèrent beaucoup d’une entreprise à l’autre. 
L’implication des partenaires sociaux locaux dans ce processus semble 
particulièrement intéressante, parce qu’elle contribue à développer 
l’appropriation collective de l’ACI et à montrer aux salariés locaux 
l’impact concret de ce texte. En principe, le processus de contrôle relève 
de la responsabilité conjointe des signataires de l’ACI, mais il peut aussi 
impliquer d’autres acteurs, comme le comité d’entreprise européen. En 
général, il y a au moins une réunion annuelle entre le management et les 
représentants des salariés pour discuter des actions qui ont été mises en 
œuvre et des difficultés rencontrées. Beaucoup d’ACI définissent aussi des 
procédures de résolution des conflits qui permettent aux salariés de dénoncer 
des violations des droits reconnus par l’accord. En principe, les salariés 
ou leurs représentants locaux doivent dans une première étape rencontrer 
les gestionnaires locaux. Si le problème ne peut être résolu à ce niveau, le 
salarié ou ses représentants peuvent saisir le syndicat au niveau national qui 
discutera du sujet avec la direction de l’entreprise dans le pays concerné. 
Si le problème ne peut toujours pas être résolu à ce niveau, ce sont les 
signataires de l’ACI qui discuteront du problème au niveau international. 
Le principal avantage de cette approche est d’impliquer les partenaires 
sociaux à tous les niveaux de l’entreprise, ce qui favorise la diffusion du 
texte et donc les chances de son application effective.
De telles procédures innovantes visant à rendre l’application du contenu 
des ACI effective sont particulièrement importantes dans la mesure où 
les ACI ne rentrent pas dans les catégories juridiques du droit du travail. 
Ils ne peuvent être considérés comme des accords collectifs et ne sont 
pas juridiquement contraignants. Même si l’absence d’un cadre juridique 
précis n’a pas empêché le développement de ces textes, elle peut poser un 
problème à l’avenir. Les partenaires sociaux ont intérêt à évaluer les risques 
juridiques en cas de non-respect des engagements contenus dans l’ACI. Un 
tel risque semble moins lié à un conflit potentiel entre les signataires, dans 
la mesure où ces textes contiennent souvent des mécanismes de résolution 
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des conflits et que les organisations syndicales ne signent pas ces textes 
pour saisir une juridiction, qu’à un conflit potentiel avec un tiers comme 
une ONG ou un citoyen individuel qui reprocherait à l’entreprise le non-
respect de l’ACI.
Un cadre juridique pour la négociation collective transnationale 
pourrait contribuer à renforcer la sécurité juridique. Idéalement, un tel 
cadre devrait être adopté au niveau international, mais le niveau européen 
pourrait constituer une première étape plus réaliste à atteindre à moyen 
terme. Le rapport Ales à la Commission européenne a défini les éléments 
principaux d’un tel cadre juridique qui ne saurait qu’être optionnel, les 
partenaires sociaux étant libres de choisir de bénéficier de la sécurité 
juridique qu’offrent ces dispositions ou de continuer à agir sans cadre 
juridique spécifique comme aujourd’hui. Ce cadre optionnel pourrait définir 
les acteurs légitimes pour négocier aussi bien du côté de l’employeur que 
du côté des salariés et, encore plus important, préciser les effets juridiques 
des ACI.

